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1 Abstract
As the medium voltage switchgear industry moves from air insulated to gas insulated
technology, Siemens Frankfurt factory is introducing a new gas insulated product line that will
improve their relative market position. It is their intent to design a product and supporting
production system that will enable substantial cost and lead time reduction over existing Siemens
gas insulated switchgear products. This thesis outlines a framework for analyzing the existing
production process from 'customer order to customer delivery', identifying areas of opportunity,
valuing projects aimed at achieving these opportunities, and prioritizing highest value projects
for implementation.
To provide a rigorous analytical approach to project selection, it was important to rethink
existing ways of valuing inventory holding costs, material handling costs, and lead time. By
uncovering hidden costs and benefits for each, projects that otherwise seemed unattractive
become important to achieving overall factory objectives. Conversely, other projects that had
been historically pushed by factory leadership were shown to generate little overall return on
investment. By using the approach outlined in this thesis, improved alignment was achieved
across departments on several high value projects. This alignment positioned the factory to
move forward with plans for successful implementation. It is the authors' hope that Frankfurt
not only finalizes implementation of high value projects identified during this analysis, but also
use the framework provided for future analysis and continued improvement.
Thesis Advisors:
Stephen C. Graves
Abraham Siegel Professor of Management, Sloan School of Management
David Simchi-Levi
Professor of Engineering Systems and Civil & Environmental Engineering, Department
of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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5 Introduction
5.1 Company Overview
Siemens AG is one of the largest multinational companies in the world. With 6 product
divisions Siemens provides products and services ranging from medical devices to power
generators. The Siemens Power Transmission and Distribution group (PTD) of the Power
Division represents 7% of Siemens total revenue with over 56 locations throughout the world
and over 25,000 employees. Headquartered in Erlangen, Germany, PTD is responsible for
producing a wide range of power switching equipment like switchgear components, protection
and control devices. This product group can be further broken down by product type. Power
Transmission and Distribution Products are first distinguished as High (72.5 to 765 kV) or
Medium Voltage (3.6 to 52 kV). As the name suggests, high voltage switching products are
designed for the purpose of switching and protecting power from the point that it is stepped up to
high voltage for long distance transmission, to the point that it is transformed down in voltage for
supply to private and industry consumers.
High Voltage Medium Voltage Medium Voltage
Distribution Primary Dist. Secondary Dist.
Figure 1 - Power Distribution
The focus of this analysis rests specifically within the Medium Voltage Product group. Medium
Voltage products represent approximately 20% of the total PTD revenue (or 1.6 billion Euros in
2006). Medium Voltage products are produced in 16 factories by nearly 5,000 employees
throughout the world. Further, Medium Voltage products are divided by those that serve primary
distribution services or those that serve secondary distribution, located near to the end consumer
as in residential areas. The distinction between primary and secondary distribution is not central
to this analysis and represents slight differences in voltage ratings and switching capability. The
focus of this analysis falls exclusively in the range of secondary distribution switchgear products.
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Finally, the switchgear market is further segmented by product technology. Within the Medium
Voltage market, products are divided by Air Insulated and Gas Insulated Technology. Section
5.2.2 provides a further description of air versus gas insulated technology. At this time, Siemens
manufactures nearly all medium voltage gas insulated switchgear at its facility in Frankfurt,
Germany. With roughly 800 employees, the Frankfurt Factory produces switchgear for
customers worldwide.
5.2 Product Overview
5.2.1 Switchgear Technology
Switchgear is considered to be a collection of power switching devices and fault protection
devices that enable the supply of power within a distribution network. Switchgear is used
primarily for two purposes. First, when coupled with circuit breaker technology it can be used to
detect short circuits and protect the remaining network by breaking the connection to the faulty
section. Second, switchgear is used to isolate sections of the network for maintenance and
repair. At the core of each switchgear device is a number of 3 phase switches designed to switch
off the current fast and reliably. Additionally, fuses and circuit breakers are incorporated with a
series of voltage and current monitoring systems.
For Siemens Frankfurt factory, the two flagship products in the Gas Insulated, Medium Voltage,
Secondary Distribution market are the 8DH and the 8DJ (see figure 2). The 8DH product line is
a highly configurable product. The 8DH product can be ordered in a modular fashion with
numerous functional 'panels' attached side by side. This creates an unlimited number of 8DH
configurations. Additionally, the 8DH product offers a complete line of voltage and current
monitoring through low voltage panels attached above the primary units.
Figure 2 - 8DH product (left) and 8DJ product (right)
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The 8DJ, by contrast is a simple and standardized product offering. The 8DJ has a limited range
of possible configurations. Additionally, low voltage compartment offerings are far more limited
than with the 8DH product. Based on its simplicity relative to the 8DH, the 8DJ is cheaper to
produce and priced lower than the 8DH.
5.2.2 Air Insulation versus Gas Insulation
For years, the dominant technology in medium voltage switchgear was air insulated switchgear.
This means that the actual 3 phase switchgear mechanism is exposed to the atmosphere. To
maintain suffient insulation distance between energized circuits, quite large design dimensions
are necessary with air insulation technology.
In 1982 Siemens introduced its first gas insulated medium voltage switchgear?. Since that time,
demand for gas insulated switchgear has grown in the marketplace. Gas insulated switchgear are
encased in sealed vessels filled with SF6 gas. The vessels has to be "sealed for life", which
means tightness for more than 30 years without any refilling. The insulating properties of this
gas are far superior to air and, thus allow for compact and maintenance free
switchgear.Additionally, the fully enclosed gas insulated switchgear is superior in protecting the
core components from atmospheric conditions. This is especially beneficial in extreme climate
conditions such as coastal, desert, and jungle conditions. Figure 3 depicts a Siemens gas
insulated vessel, housing the core switchgear and switching devices.
Figure 3 - Switchgear Corepart
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5.3 Business Overview
5.3.1 Environment
Siemens PTD initially entered the switchgear market with its line of high voltage and primary
distribution products. These products sell mostly to power producers as well as public and
private electric distribution utilities. For these customers, functionality and reliability are of
higher priority than lead time and low price. Therefore, Siemens focused on developing
competitive advantage through superior product engineering, strong technical support,
engineering services and customization. Customers were willing to spend 3 to 4 months in the
custom design phase and, therefore understood that a product with such customization would be
more expensive and time consuming to build.
This superior quality design and customer facing engineering support became the cornerstone of
the medium voltage business as well. Initially, Siemens leveraged its high voltage customer base
to establish a presence in the medium voltage, secondary distribution market. Focus in this new
space started with their existing group of customers, which excluded several large customer
groups, such as resellers and end-users. Siemens' widely recognized brand and reputation for
quality helped it establish a strong position among end-users of medium voltage products.
However, the needs of resellers and wholesalers are of lower importance in the Siemens medium
voltage product slate. These customers are essentially systems integrators, purchasing
individual switchgear and then integrating the necessary components to establish turn-key
project solutions. These customers are sometimes in indirect competition with Siemens value
proposition to provide detailed design and engineering solutions for the customer. These
integrated power transmission solutions sell at a premium and can generate heavy volumes.
However, these customers are less interested in customized components and more focused on
price and lead time. Due to the existing utility and industry oriented sales organization, Siemens
left this commoditized markect to other manufacturers.
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Figure 4 - GIS Secondary Market Share
In the last 5 years, the medium voltage switchgear market has seen higher growth rates for gas
insulation technology than for air insulation technology. As this development continues to
unfold, it is clear that most all major players in the switchgear industry are taking steps to capture
more of the gas insulated market then they previously held in the air insulated market. This
developing GIS market is the driver for Siemens' Portfolio 2008 initiative.
5.3.2 Portfolio 2008
The Portfolio 2008 team was established in an effort to design and bring to market a new line of
Secondary Medium Voltage Gas Insulated Switchgear. This new product line would replace
both the 8DJ and 8DH product lines. The team was given aggressive goals for production cost
reduction as well as softer directive to reduce customer lead time. In this way, Siemens hoped to
capture an appreciable portion of the wholesaler market.
The team, comprised largely of product design engineers, was functionally organized into 4
groups that targeted a full redesign of their respective switchgear function. To keep the
functional teams sufficiently integrated, all designers worked in a common office space that
facilitated cross functional collaboration. Additionally, the team included members that focused
on linking the effort to other parts of the organization. A sales representative focused on
bridging the Portfolio 2008 efforts to the entire Medium Voltage Sales operation. Moreover, a
small team of manufacturing engineers worked closely with the manufacturing staff of the
Frankfurt Factory to incorporate design for manufacturability principles into the design process.
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It is this manufacturing group of the Portfolio 2008 team that served as home base for the
analysis to follow.
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6 Project Introduction
6.1 Business Problem Statement
The underlying objective associated with this internship can be quite simply stated as follows:
1. Analyze the Gas Insulated Switchgear process from 'Customer Order to Customer
Delivery' for the 8DH and 8DJ product lines.
2. Provide recommendations that will enable reduction in cost and lead time on the focus
products today and to help bridge the gap for the rollout of Project Portfolio 2008.
Since the project was chartered by the Portfolio 2008 team, the primary interest of this analysis
was to benefit the introduction of the new product lines. These recommendations would help
enable a smooth product introduction into the market at a sufficiently competitive price point and
with lead times that would attract increasing interest from the wholesale market. However, it is
clear that the analysis of the complete value chain for the existing 8DJ and 8DH product lines
would offer tremendous value, both for the remaining life of these products as well as key
learning for other existing products manufactured in the Frankfurt factory. For this reason, the
Frankfurt factory management was jointly invested in this analysis for their own continuous
improvement and future success.
6.2 Approach - Pyramid of Phases
Given the incredibly wide scope of the project as well as the offset timing of the primary project
leads, it was paramount that the project be defined in a structured manner that would facilitate a
clean transition from project lead to project lead. The project was organized in three distinct
steps, each spanning a three-month time frame. The first phase would create a foundation
through current state process mapping and data collection. Jacob Wood led this phase. The
second phase, a joint effort by Jacob Wood and Curtis Underwood, would analyze the current
state information, identify areas of opportunity, and perform ROI analysis on each. The third
phase would focus on implementation of the most attractive projects. Curtis Underwood led this
final phase.
15
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Figure 5 - 3 Phases of the Project
Phase I:
Principally a process mapping exercise, Phase I established the foundation of information
necessary to completely understand the value chain. This process mapping incorporated the
entire business process associated with the 8DH and 8DJ product lines from the initial customer
order capture to the final delivery of the completed switchgear. From this effort, an in-depth
understanding of the process was gained and potential areas of opportunity were identified.
Phase II:
Building on a sound understanding of Siemens switchgear manufacturing and business
processes, the focus shifted to quantification of the opportunities shown by phase I. In order to
quantify these opportunities, the cost structure of the product and the facility were studied,
uncovering many hidden costs. Previously under-explored valuations of product lead-time,
holding cost, and internal handling were conducted through rigorous analytical methods.
More than 20 potential improvement opportunities were developed and vetted through a series of
steps. These steps comprise a proposed framework for addressing a value chain analysis of this
magnitude.
Identify Areas of Opportunity: Simply identify the fact that an opportunity exists for
improvement to the process from a cost or lead time point of view.
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Quantify the Opportunity: Perform the necessary analysis to understand the potential
upside of the identified opportunity. This provides an eye opening analysis to factory
leadership of the potential that exists within the process.
Identify Projects that will realize the opportunity: Once an opportunity is understood and
determined to be sizeable enough for further exploration, tangible projects are outlined to
realize some or all of the defined opportunity. Since this opportunity has been clearly
identified, projects are structured to directly target that particular prospect. Through this
first stage in the vetting process, some academically interesting opportunities were
eliminated when appropriate projects could not be formulated. This framework helped
eliminate exciting opportunities that just did not make sense for the specific operation or
established factory principles.
Cost/Benefit Analysis: Once projects are identified, it is important to refine the cost
benefit analysis and determine the financial return for each project. Taking the time to
establish the project level return on investment (ROI) or net present value (NPV)
provides the business a tangible means of determining project attractiveness that is far
more rigorous than seeking leadership buyoff on projects rooted only in philosophical
terms.
Implementation: With the projects defined and characterized, the most attractive projects
are selected for implementation. Then the hard work begins. Resources must be
allocated and effort deployed to change established work practices on the shop floor. As
previous assumptions or estimates are challenged or found to be incorrect, this feedback
is iteratively reinserted in this project vetting process as deemed appropriate.
It is clear that following this process was time and resource consuming. However, it is the
opinion of the authors that this framework is essential in developing an analytical case for
continued process improvement in areas that otherwise have rejected such improvements. The
lean efforts approach employed in improving the final assembly area reached organizational and
political barriers that prevented further proliferation. The proposed framework above is a
methodical way to overcome those barriers through a series of analytical steps that can open the
eyes of the most discerning department managers.
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Phase III:
Upon completion of phase 1I, the primary project stakeholders selected the three most attractive
projects. Curtis Underwood would drive these projects through implementation. Seven
remaining projects were documented and transferred to the appropriate Siemens stakeholders for
future implementation.
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7 Current State Analysis
This section begins with a brief review of the various aspects of the value chain that will be
referenced throughout the thesis. Next, the underlying methods used to complete the current
state analysis are examined. Finally, key insights associated with the initial process mapping
exercises are reviewed.
7.1 Process Flow
Circuit Breaker o . o . M
In 4W4 ndwGm
Figure 6 - The process flow for Siemens' 8DH and 8DJ Medium Voltage Switchgear
7.2 Order Processing
Initially, orders for 8DJ and 813H products taken throughout the world are entered into two
primary systems. First, all of the commercial information relevant to the order such as price,
quantity, and shipping requirements are collected via SAP. Second, a set of initial technical
specifications is recorded in a computer system that houses order specific technical information
and product engineering decisions. Once initial data exists in these systems, Siemens Center of
Competence begins the necessary order-specific engineering required. This requirement can be
as little as zero for highly standardized 8DJ products, to 4 weeks of detailed low voltage wiring
design as part of a complex 8DH order with Circuit Breaker technology.
Once the technical and commercial orders are complete, the order processing teams (organized
functionally by product type) collect the information and begin the process of merging the data
into a single factory SAP system. This SAP system will handle all of the physical inventory
tracking, reporting, and ordering for each new order. Additionally, the Order Processing
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departments are responsible for entering each order into their M2 computer system, which
enables the comprehensive tracking of customer order milestones and performance to these
milestones. M2 is used for this purpose over SAP because it allows for the tracking of key order
dates that are not commensurate with an action taken on a physical part, such as the completion
of a wiring diagram. All remaining activities such as external part ordering, part production,
warehouse retrieval, and assembly scheduling are automatically back calculated from the key
dates associated with M2 and SAP. While Frankfurt's assembly process is exclusively
make/assemble to order, systems for part production are largely make to stock. Part production
methods and order processing mechanisms are explained briefly below.
Make to Order:
For highly customized parts (usually associated with highly customized, long lead time orders),
production is initiated only after the customer order has been received. Starting with the quoted
shipping date, M2 back calculates the required start of assembly date. This date serves as a
trigger for all build to order parts. The part production release date is back calculated from the
start of assembly date based on the lead time for the part in SAP. Pre-production has the ability
to pull in production jobs that have not yet been released, but this is only done on occasion.
Once these parts have been produced, they are routinely stored in the central warehouse until
retrieved by final assembly. These parts are a small portion of parts made in Frankfurt.
Direct Pull System:
About 1% of Frankfurt's part production volume employs a true pull system called Direct or
Eigenfertigung Kanban (E-Kanban). At least two boxes of parts are stored at or near the line.
When a box is empty, the kanban card is removed and another is reordered at a nearby computer
on the shop floor. SAP schedules a pre-production order, which is released with the next batch
of orders (usually once per day). When the box is filled with newly made parts, it is transported
from pre-production directly to the final assembly area. The number of parts per box is
determined primarily by the box's volume and weight capacity. Historically, only frequently
used parts that can be produced quickly (low lead-time) have been converted to E-Kanban.
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Indirect Pull System:
Indirect Umlagerung Kanban (U-Kanban) makes up around 20% of Frankfurt's production
volume. This type of Kanban is actually two pull systems decoupled by the large warehouse.
By decoupling the systems, pre-production can size batches independent of how assembly
prefers to receive the parts, allowing them to size batches in a locally efficient manner and
reduce setup costs. Multiple boxes of each part are stored in the warehouse, while only 2 boxes
are stored at or near the assembly line. As with E-Kanban, Assembly reorders when they empty
a box. With U-Kanban however, the box of parts is retrieved from the warehouse and is
consistently delivered within one day. More details on methods for calculating necessary safety
stock and cycle stock can be found in section 8.3.
Q-R Production:
Most parts manufactured in the Frankfurt plant are still made to predefined stock levels, where
SAP manages target levels of inventory in the warehouse. Similar to U-Kanban, though more of
a push system, this model requires Assembly to pull needed parts from the warehouse in 1-box
increments, while Pre-production can fill the warehouse with multi-box batches. Instead of
using kanban orders, SAP releases orders for predetermined batch sizes. SAP uses projected part
usage based on the assembly schedule to release orders with the aim of receiving the parts on the
day that inventory reaches the target. For example; if the target inventory level is 100 parts, it
takes 5 days to deliver a batch of 200 parts, current inventory is 160 parts and projected usage
this week is 10 parts per day: SAP would release an order tomorrow, such that in 6 days, when
projected inventory is at the target 100 parts, the new batch of 200 parts should arrive in the
warehouse.
Straight Push:
Due to certain current capacity constraints, for instance, all resin parts are made to stock using a
push system. These parts are produced at near-capacity level production year round and
removed from inventory as dictated by seasonal demand variation. Though these parts comprise
a significant portion of pre-production, management excluded resin from further exploration
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since capacity decisions were viewed as set in the short term and otherwise determined in the
long term.
For more information on push, pull, make to stock and make to order, please see Hopp &
Spearman 'To Pull or Not to Pull: What is the question?'."'
7.3 Pre-Production
Siemens currently manufactures about 40% by volume of the parts that comprise their 8DJ and
8DH products. For these parts, the pre-production process is an organization of process
'islands', each with a distinct function. The following is a brief description of the primary pre-
production islands explored in this project.
Sheet Steel: A majority of Frankfurt's pre-production activity centers around traditional sheet
steel processes. Various thicknesses and compositions of sheet steel are worked in a
combination of laser cutting, punching, bending, high volume stamping, and welding operations.
Thousands of different types of sheet metal parts are manufactured through these steps. Each
part is assigned a route of specific operations. While the high volume of part varieties can create
some challenges operationally, only about 3% of all the part types can not be fit into one of
approximately ten relatively standard processing routes. Additionally, almost half of all parts
processed through sheet steel production are processed solely through a laser cut or punching
operation.
Aluminum: While the aluminum island does not directly produce parts that go into the 8DJ or
8DH products, this production process is a substantial part of the overall logistics of the
Frankfurt factory. For this reason, a brief description of the process is offered. The Aluminum
Island is a machining process whereby aluminum castings, purchased externally, are machined to
tolerance to form interchangeable gas compartments. These aluminum compartments are mostly
used in the larger primary distribution products.
Resin: Each switchgear product sold contains a variety of parts designed as insulators against
the flow of electrical current. In the 8DJ and 8DH products, these insulators are used as
bushings to pass electrical current through the stainless steel core-part enclosures. These
bushings are manufactured in a process that fills molds with an insulating resin. This resin
molding process is extremely sensitive to a variety of external factors such as mold temperature,
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resin temperature, ambient humidity, and cleanliness of the copper inserts into the bushings.
Any voids, cracks, or other defects in the bushing could create a leak or possible future leak in
the SF6 filled core part of the switchgear. For this reason, the resin process currently employs
numerous inspections of each bushing after processing. These tests include bushing leak testing,
X-ray inspection to identify voids and cracks, and electrical testing to ensure the bushing
effectively transfers current.
Copper: In each of the 8DJ and 8DH products, current is transported throughout the switchgear
by way of a rectangular copper bus bar. With the advent of the Gas Insulated Switchgear,
manufacturers have configured the core parts to be as small as regulations allow. The copper bus
bars inside these products often have several multi-axial bends to fit in this tightly packed space.
The Frankfurt Factory uses a combination of 2-D and 3-D bending equipment to make this
possible. Copper bar stock is automatically fed into a machine that cuts the bars into desired
length and stamps the required connection holes in each end. These individual pieces are then
loaded onto the bending machines where they are bent and twisted into the necessary
configuration.
Paint: Approximately 25% of all sheet steel parts produced in Frankfurt are then painted before
assembly. The Frankfurt Paint operation represents the only operation in Frankfurt that allows
external customers to use excess capacity. The painting operation in Frankfurt can be defined as
two entities; powder coat and spray painting. The powder coat line is fully automated where
unpainted parts are hung on an overhead conveyor and processed. Changing paint colors on the
powder coat line is time consuming and requires Siemens to batch parts by like-color to reduce
the total number of color changeovers required each day.
7.3.1 Parts Warehouse
One of the primary mechanisms that have allowed Frankfurt Final Assembly processes to
develop extensive pull systems has been the parts warehouse. Considering that this factory has
not carried their one piece flow philosophy to the pre-production process or the external supplier
management processes, the warehouse has acted as a primary buffer between larger scale batch
processing and parts delivery and the more synchronous events of final assembly. The impact
of warehouse operations on the rest of the processes is further discussed in section 8.2.1.
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7.3.2 Core Part Assembly
Once orders have been scheduled for production, the next series of operations involve welding
the core part vessel and then assembly of the switchgear into this vessel. Each of the 8DJ and
8DH product lines has their own dedicated core part assembly lines. The core part production
process is also discussed in more detail in section 8.4.1 as related to production sequencing
improvements. Once the core part has been assembled and closed, the final steps in this process
involve the actual filling of the core part housing with SF6 gas. At this point the core parts are
transported to the final assembly lines.
7.3.3 Circuit Breaker Production
For the 8DH product line, approximately half of all products have incorporated circuit breaker
technology. These circuit breakers account for nearly x% of the total product cost. For the
existing 8DH process, Circuit breakers are produced in a separate factory located in Berlin,
Germany. Orders for circuit breakers are submitted from Frankfurt to the Berlin site as part of
the SAP parts inventory management process. The Berlin factory maintains an 8 day lead time
commitment to the Frankfurt factory and currently makes two truck shipments per day to
facilitate lower working inventories of circuit breakers in final assembly.
7.3.4 Final Assembly
Once all necessary components have been produced, external parts have been delivered, and
coreparts have been assembled, the switchgear is fully assembled, tested, and packaged for
shipment. Overall, this process represents a relative small fraction of the total customer lead
time.
Currently, 8DH and 8DJ products are assembled on dedicated lines. Each line is comprised of
workstations that contain sets of tasks aimed at achieving station Takt time, or standard pace, of
20 minutes per switchgear panel. Daily assembly schedules are sequenced as needed to
minimize the disruptive effect of variable assembly times associated with custom orders.
Additionally some orders with extremely high levels of additional assembly content, such as low
voltage wiring, are removed from the flow of the assembly line and completed by a single
assembler.
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7.4 History of Lean initiatives at the Frankfurt Factory
Siemens' Frankfurt Factory has a history of process improvement initiatives that began with the
implementation of a traditional lean improvement framework in the final assembly processes of
the medium voltage secondary switchgear products (8DJ and 8DH). Included in these
improvements was the adoption of such principles as standardized work, kanban based inventory
pull systems, use of takt time to create constant assembly line flow. In addition, the Frankfurt
factory held regular kaizen events in an effort to foster a continuous improvement mindset
throughout. These initiatives were successful in improving overall labor efficiency and cycle
time within the final assembly process. To cement these concepts into the factory culture, these
principles were captured in the Frankfurt Production System, or FPS.
In the greater view of the entire value chain, these improvement efforts represent islands of
success that, if left unconnected, would prevent the Frankfurt operation from achieving desired
results.v Lean improvements had sharp boundaries within the organization that marked where
the new way of thinking stopped and the old way of thinking began. Moreover, the boundaries
between lean processing and traditional methods represented enormous areas of opportunities.
This is most visible in the form of a large inventory buffer of parts that decoupled the pre-
production operations and part procurement from the final assembly process. Neither the pre-
production or external part purchasing processes fully embraced the above-mentioned lean
concepts. As a result momentum from these lean efforts failed to go beyond the assembly parts
warehouse. The recently adopted lean principles of the final assembly processes relied on
frequent and reliable deliveries of parts on an as needed bases. The surrounding processes,
however, were not established to provide such deliveries of parts.
In light of this, and other, barriers to creating a value-chain wide lean system, what could be
done to overcome such obstacles? In this assessment, the philosophically driven lean practices
must be augmented with sound analytical rigor. It is in this way that discerning managers can
best understand the benefits of a more comprehensive transformation. In other words; lean as a
mantra had reached as far as it was going to reach. Something was needed to help this
organization extend these efforts in a structured, methodical way.
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7.5 Methods
The initial current state analysis for this project represented more than a starting off point for the
future project phases. It represented a strong desire from the Portfolio 2008 leadership to capture
a complete 'picture' of the value chain. For this reason, individual process maps were captured
in substantially more detail and completeness than would be done in a traditional analysis. This
consumed tremendous project resources up front. However, the energy expended was extremely
worthwhile in establishing a trust within the organization that these efforts and analysis would be
based on more than a cursory understanding of the processes. [Those] who identify a need to
bridge silos in technocratic cultures must first build credibility as a discipline specialist before
trying to sell cross-functional ideas.'
7.5.1 Process Maps
The process mapping exercise discussed here had several distinct similarities to traditional lean
value stream mapping. The objective was two fold. The first objective was to employ a
graphical mechanism for highlighting areas of opportunity for waste reduction and value
creation. The second objective was to establish a catalog of detailed process maps to
characterize the various processes.
As with Lean Value Stream Mapping, what it is that is flowing through the process must first be
determined. It is clear that for this analysis, customer orders are the primary unit of what is
flowing through the process. That is not to say that each detailed process map represents the
flow as customer orders. Certainly the order processing and engineering aspects of the value
chain are represented in terms of orders. However, assembly processes are more simply
represented in terms of physical switchgear units. Additionally, the pre-production processes are
represented in terms of the components that they produce. When the process maps are
assembled at a higher level into a global process map, the appropriate units of flow are converted
to provide a consistent representation of the process. For example, before 8DJ orders pass
through order processing and engineering into assembly, the orders are organized over a multiple
day window and broken into a logical sequence of switchgear to be assembled. At this point in
the process, visibility to the order itself is only retained at the level of each piece of switchgear
and the associated production schedule date.
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One distinction of importance is the notation for total flow time associated with the process. As
with lean value stream mapping, a distinction was made between value added time and non-
value added time. However, the view value added time in this analysis was quite general given
the constraints of project resources. Non-Value added time, represented on the upper lines,
indicates time associated with two things: inventory queues and operations that are quite easily
discerned as not directly critical in further adding value to the order. These sorts of operations
include rework operations, unregulated product testing, unnecessary checks and double checks,
etc. For simplicity, value added time, represented on the lower lines, is considered to be the total
time to complete any operation excluding any non-value added time. Within pre-production it is
clear that a necessary welding process step is comprised of both value and non-value added time.
Since theoretical planned job times were used for process flow times, it was not feasible to
extract out the inherent non-value added inefficiencies associated with those steps.
One final distinction from lean value stream mapping involved how to represent the various
product types that travel the process. The Frankfurt factory offers a very wide range of product
combinations. Additionally, any of these products can be customized at the customer's request.
Because Frankfurt runs with such a wide range of customization and combinations, it was not
completely telling to pick one order and map it through to completion. Many of the unique
issues and/or necessary steps that arise with various orders would then be overlooked. For this
reason, process maps were represented as general maps that indicate relative frequencies for
intermittent process steps. This does tend to aggregate much of the information and, as a result,
lose some potential insights. However, given the resource limitations for such a wide scoped
project, it was felt that this was the only realistic way to capture the reality of Frankfurt's product
and part variability within a single set of process maps. Figure 7 is shown as an example of the
mapping exercise.
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Figure 7 - Process Map for 8DJ product Order Processing. Each shade represents a separate department
Data used to support the afore-mentioned value stream mapping was based on a variety of
sources internal to Simes. Primarily, historical data were collected through existing report
archives and databases within the company. Additionally, interviews were conducted to gain
further insight into the data, as well as shed light on facets of the process flow where historical
data did not exist. This combined set of information enabled the completion of phase I as well as
defined sources of data to fuel phases II and III. The following is a brief description of the
primary sources of data used for this analysis.
SAP: Siemens Frankfurt Factory relies primarily on SAP for all physical inventory
management as well as parts production and assembly coordination. For this reason,
SAP provided a nearly complete data set for parts production capacity and flow time
analysis. One year of historical data ranging from March 2004 to March 2005 was
extracted from the SAP data archives and served as a core set of data for numerous
analyses. In addition to capacity and flow time analysis of physical part production, this
data set gave a foundation to the inventory optimization projects discussed further in
Section 8.
'In order to maintain confidentiality for Siemens, sensitive data has been modified to mask the
true absolute quantities.
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M2: As discussed earlier, each 8DH order requires a tremendous amount of custom
engineering. An example of this would be the customer specific wiring requirements
between voltage sensors, circuit breakers, and the actual medium voltage switch. While
the physical order is progressing through the process under the umbrella of SAP
coordination, many other necessary tasks that do not represent physical goods must be
managed. Examples of these tasks include, wiring schematics, NC programming for
custom panels, and testing requirements for each new order. The M2 tool is used by the
factory to mesh together performance to schedule management of the SAP controlled
activities and the non-physical engineering activities.
Since the M2 acts as a holding place for each order's performance to specific process
milestones, historical M2 data was extremely useful in the detailed analysis of product
lead time discussed in Section 8.4. One full year of historical data was extracted from
M2 history allowing for an analytically sound investigation into the effects of variability
on each phase of switchgear production.
Financial Reports:
Summarized financial reports were employed to collect information regarding individual
part costs as well as actual part demand over time. This data was critical in driving part
level inventory optimization analysis.
Interview: For process areas such as order processing, it was not possible to collect
historical data to characterize the documented process flows. This was somewhat
problematic considering that many of the activities within the order processing and
custom engineering departments contained a high degree of variation. However, if left
undefined, answers to the question of variability would be quite inconsistent from
interview to interview. For this reason, the interviews were standardized to maintain
consistent interpretation of flow times. For a given process step, interviewees were asked
the following questions:
El What is the average clock time it takes to complete this step when nothing
substantial goes wrong?
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El What is the average amount of time you must spend working on this step
when nothing substantial goes wrong?
El What percentage of orders requires this step on average?
EL When the step takes longer than average to complete, what is the cause?
o Repeat questions for each assignable cause
By using this format for collection of flow time data, the analysis can isolate relative
frequency of occurrence, how impactful the operation is to the flow time, and how much
labor is consumed in completing the operation. Additionally, isolating the cause of
variability as separate activities, as much as possible, allowed for a more thoughtful
analysis of the cumulative effect of variability on the total process.
Although a variety of collection methods were employed to establish baseline flow times for
each process step, a few key themes were present through the process. First, the analysis must
consider not only the average flow time, but some measure of the variation of flow time in the
system as well. Certainly this aspect of the total process flow time is not well understood in the
factory. Second, process step level flow time is clearly not additive in the determination of
overall value chain flow time. To better represent this point, process flow time was represented
in a Gantt chart depicting the flow time critical path. This would prove to be a key insight for
the factory in that each product group had a unique critical path. In other words, elimination of
flow time from one process might enable shorter lead times for the 8DJ while not impacting 8DH
lead times at all. This is important for the Portfolio 2008 effort as well. It is critical to
understand that not all flow time reduction efforts would impact the eventual ability to promise
customers shorter lead time.
7.6 Insights From Current State analysis
It became clear during phase I of the project that most of the process maps and supporting data
were well understood by various employees within the organization. Additionally, it was clear
that no one individual or group of individuals had a collective understanding of the entire process
and all the interactions of inventory and information therein. Department managers were highly
tuned to the detailed activities of their department. Processing capacity, inventory costs, and
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flow times were all well optimized at the department level. But at the edges of the departments,
process characteristics were not well understood and inter-departmental communication was less
fluid. A senior executive at Toyota once summed up the typical German firm by saying, "Who I
really fear as competitors are the Germans, if they ever learn how to talk to each other."
Tremendous opportunity for improvement exists where inventory and information jump the
departmental divide. Two examples of these potential opportunities are discussed next. The first
deals with the flow of order information. The second deals with the flow of physical goods
through the assembly processes.
Flow of information
Chinese sales account for a sizeable and rapidly growing part of Frankfurt's business. When an
8DH product is ordered from Chinese customers, the field sales representative captures the
commercial order information and triggers support specialists to calculate a final price for the
order. All of this work takes only 20 minutes time. The order is then sent via email to the
central office in Germany where it sits in queue. The time in queue is a combination of delays
due to periodic queue checks (people don't continuously inspect their email inbox) and the 8
hour time zone difference that creates a frequent overnight delay (neither office runs
continuously). The order is then inspected for accuracy and entered into the SAP system.
Finally the order is sent back to China for engineering work through the regional Center of
Competence. This regional engineering activity was established to create fewer cultural
boundaries between Siemens and the customer with regard to detailed technical specifications.
Once this engineering work is done, the order is sent again back to Germany for production.
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China Erlangen, Germany China
Regional Sales Central Office - 'Stamhaus' Center of Competance
Rework Loop
Freq: 10%
Added time: 1 days
Added Labor. 0.8 Hrs
Central Sales Central Purchasing
Ire -_riiOrdenr Order entered into
Queue
0,33 Hirs 0,33 Hrs 0,33 Hrs
12 Hirs 4 Hrs 12 Hrs
Figure 8 - Order Processing for all 8DH orders captured in China
From this scenario, it is clear that the only value added to the process in the German Sales office
is that of verification and data entry. So over 24 hours of additional lead time for this product is
associated with a desire by the German sales office to check the work of the Chinese office
before any further work could be done. Additionally, there is a sentiment that the regional
offices do not have the skills to establish the order in SAP. When viewed department by
department, each department is doing an effective job of processing work as it fits within their
scope. However, the number of needless and costly exchanges indicates an opportunity for
improved inter-departmental coordination.
Flow of product
As described above, the central sub-assembly of the switch gear is the corepart. Once an order is
released for assembly, the corepart is first to be produced. This corepart is filled with SF6 gas
and then sent on to the final assembly. Figure 9 depicts the last steps of corepart assembly and
the first steps of final assembly. Each department is managed quite efficiently and has been the
focus of numerous productivity improvements over the last decade. However, it is interesting to
note the redundant buffers that connect the two departments. On the core part side, a small one
hour buffer of production is kept to protect their own departmental reputation for consistent
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downstream feeds. As they see it, any downtime to the laser welding machines or gas filling
machines would damage their departmental reputation. This buffer then directly feeds into the
final assembly buffer. The final assembly buffer is kept to protect their own interests from the
upstream supplier, corepart assembly. One could argue that the only reason buffers are not
combined or pooled rests in the organizational structure of the process.
SF6 Filling Operation
Core-Part Assembly 8DJ Final Assembly
Helium Test / SF6 Fill
% of Flow .-100%
Stations - 2
Takt Time - 20 min
Helim PrtestFill TubeHelium Pretest Crim eld/Test
%of Flow -100% % of Flow -1O% 8DJ Floor
Ta T - 3 min Stati 4 Inv - I hourTtlm3inTkt Time -4 min A-
0.3 Hours 0.67 Hours
1 Hour 3 Hours
Figure 9 - 8DJ product transition from Core-Part assembly to Final Assembly
Another example of Frankfurt's attempt to buffer the impacts of one department on another is the
parts warehouse. This warehouse allows the pre-production and external vendor batching
decisions to be independent of assembly needs, and acts as a massive communication divide
between departments. On the one hand, it has created an opportunity for assembly to make
substantial productivity gains through its evolution of lean assembly without impacting the
upstream operations. On the other hand, not incorporating these upstream operations has limited
the gains at the overall factory level while, at the same time, creating an increasingly larger
divide between the philosophy of assembly and the philosophy of part production.
Another discovery from the process mapping exercise of phase I was the prevalence of rework
that exists throughout the flow of a switchgear order. Most noticeably was the time, both in
labor and total flow time, which is taken addressing errors as they occur throughout the flow.
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This can again be traced back to incentives on the part of individual departments to maximize
their own operation with less regard for the good of the entire system. Take, for example, the
sales capture process. Regional sales people have little incentive to ensure that every detail of
the commercial order is captured correctly. They know that the central sales office as well as the
Frankfurt order processing departments will discover any errors that they make. In fact, regional
sales can actually demonstrate increased efficiency if the job is done with decreasing regard for
quality. This is predicated on the inability of Siemens to trace these errors back to the root cause
and, in turn, penalize them for the error. As errors are found later in the process, they become
more costly to resolve. This resulting insight formed the foundation of several recommended
projects to eliminate these errors before they occur.
Insights were also taken from the overall review of lead time for the 8DJ and 8DH products.
Most notably, the critical path for customer lead time was different for 8DJ and 8DH products.
For 8DJ products, the critical path was largely dominated by lead time for parts ordered
externally for a specific order. Section 8.4 discusses this in more depth. For the 8DH product,
the critical path did not include vendor lead time, but rather was largely dominated by the custom
engineering processes required for the circuit breaker products. This was a useful take-away for
Siemens because it eliminated the magic bullet mentality that many held within the company. It
focused their attention on fully understanding the value of process content and that process
content value varied widely. Project valuation will be discussed fully in Section 8.
34
8 Project Valuation
In order to convert the potential opportunities found while mapping the switchgear process into
incontrovertible economic evidence, it was necessary to convert tangible project results into
common monetary units. A list of internal valuations was created based on actual and estimated
operating costs and revenue opportunities, which were otherwise intangible, not easily attainable
or disagreed upon in the factory. These internal valuations include lead time value, employee
labor costs, inventory carrying cost etc. Developing and building consensus for these valuations
was the critical first step to creating economic incentives in the factory to justify change and
create a market where intelligently determined change could organically flourish.
8.1 Opportunity Analysis
During the process mapping exercise, significant inventories throughout the factory were noted.
These areas became an obvious area of opportunity as improvement plans for the facility were
developed. The most glaring inventory in the factory is certainly the vast central warehouse that
divides the operation between pre-production and final assembly. As explained previously in
Chapter 7, Frankfurt is essentially two separate factories decoupled by the central warehouse.
As discussed in Section 7.2, two different Kanban systems govern the movement of materials in
the factory. Most parts utilize Umlagerung (through warehouse) Kanban, which involves the
assembly line pulling materials from warehouse inventory. In-turn, the warehouse is replenished
by pre-production through orders of predetermined size, which are triggered when stock levels
reach a predefined reorder point as defined in SAP. This allows pre-production order sizes to be
decoupled from usable volumes on the assembly line. Savings can be offset or eliminated by
increased handling costs and inventory holding costs. Eigenfertigung (literally self-made)
Kanban materials are sent around the warehouse and arrive directly on the assembly line.
Externally manufactured parts are not part of any kanban system and are handled by a group of
material coordinators (Disponenten) and through Siemens MRP system.
There are two major potential areas of opportunity in factories operating as outlined in the brief
high-level description provided above. First, converting parts from Umlagerung to
Eigenfertigung Kanban reduces inventory and eliminates unnecessary handling. These savings
are often coupled with offsetting costs, such as increased setup time and increased space
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requirements alongside the assembly line. This effort is fundamental to the principles of Lean
Manufacturing, as it provides more space, more free cash flow and more connectivity in the
value chain while using less inventory, fewer resources and lowering lead times. An analysis
was completed on a part-by-part basis and will be explored in-depth in Section 8.2 below.
Second, a full exploration of current inventory management practices could lead to an overall
reduction of inventories and properly balance the risk of stockout with the cost of holding
inventory. This project will also be explored in full detail in Section 8.3 below.
A thorough analytical consideration of the approaches outlined above, requires the valuation of
several variable cost factors including holding cost, handling cost and setup costs. Further, less
tangible considerations such as labor and capacity utilization must also be considered. These are
often considered separately since they usually behave in a non-linear manner and are not
discretely valued.
8.2 Costs of Machine Setup and Inventory Handling
Setup and handling costs should be relatively simple to determine, though they were not widely
agreed upon within the factory. Setup labor costs include both the cost of employing personnel
as well as the number of hours spent on machine setup. Employee wages are often used, but this
does not capture the full cost of employing personnel. The United States Department of Labor
defines compensation as "payroll plus supplemental payments, is a measure of the cost to the
employer of securing the services of labor. Payroll includes salaries, wages, commissions,
dismissal pay, bonuses, vacation and sick leave pay, and compensation in kind.""' In addition,
the variable portions of overhead costs for managing these benefits (such as human resources)
and supporting the employee should also be included since they reflect the cost of employing
that person. The true cost of labor is typically higher than the base wage by a factor of 2 to 2.5
(the cost a company would bill-out and employee, not the employees wage alone and can vary
widely by industry and company).
In most operations employee costs are well understood, while setup times are more anomalous.
In Frankfurt, setup times were studied to an exacting degree, documented and even included in
the labor contract. However, the cost of the personnel conducting the machine setups and
material handling was not widely agreed upon. Initial estimates for this relatively simple cost
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factor varied widely with the highest estimates being double the smallest. This inconsistency on
this relatively simple matter clearly illustrated a need for a table of internal valuations to enable
managers to make intelligent decisions consistently throughout the organization.
After gaining consensus on a labor rate for the Frankfurt factory, this valuation was applied in
two main arenas. First, labor valuation was used for projects that resulted in the elimination of
excess labor and wasted handling. These opportunities were identified in three main locations;
entry into the warehouse, withdrawal from the warehouse and between areas of managerial
responsibility. The second use of labor valuations involved labor valuation for machine setup
times. These situations often balance the benefits of reduced batch size with the increased costs
resulting from increasing the number of setups.
8.2.1 Project Application - Kanban Conversion
One example that incorporates both of these areas involves the conversion of Umlagerung
(Indirect) Kanban to Eigenfertigung (Direct) Kanban. This inventory optimization project was
selected as one of the three projects to be implemented during the LFM internship. Figure 10
represents the basic structure of the factory and the basic flow of parts from pre-production to
final assembly.
Pre-Production Warehouse Assembly
Umlagerung
Eigenfertigung
Figure 10 - Factory Kanban Flow
As previously described, U-Kanban parts are moved into the warehouse and later taken to the
assembly line. Using the warehouse as a buffer allows both a very short delivery time to the
assembly line (about 1 day on average) and flexibility in batch size. More than 99% of parts
follow the path of Umlagerung Kanban parts (includes make-to-stock parts as described in
section 7.2 above) and are typically large batches as they enter the warehouse. These large
batches are later removed from the warehouse in quantities that are appropriate for Final
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Assembly. This can require further part sorting, though parts usually stay in one of 17 standard
box-types throughout the process. Eigenfertigung Kanban parts, which are taken directly to the
assembly line, currently account for less than 1% of pre-production part output. Use of this
direct kanban system eliminates unnecessary handling at the warehouse, but also comes with the
cost of longer delivery lead times and the need for manageable batches. Though both kanban
systems are arguably 'pull systems', U-Kanban fails to capture many of the values that these
systems are designed to capture. Per Hopp and Spearman, the most frequently cited benefits of
pull systems are:2
. Reduced WIP and Cycle Time - from directly limiting WIP to specified levels
. Smoother Production Flow - through WIP level dampening
. Improved Quality - due to pressures on the system to operate under constraints
. Reduced Cost - due to increased stresses on the system
Of these four, U-Kanban, as implemented in Frankfurt, generates only smoother production flow.
Final assembly can reliably get parts whenever they need them and pre-production delivery dates
for replenishing the warehouse are rather loose due to the buffer volume therein. The buffer
volume within this central warehouse symbolizes high levels of WIP (negating the 1 " item on the
list above), while removing stress on the system (thus negating the 3 d and 4th items). E-Kanban
however, would remove large amounts of WIP, eliminate non value-added handling from the
system and increase stress on delivery times, part quality and pre-production efficiency.
From the onset of this project, it was clear that the warehouse was a burden on the factory and a
major drag on factory operations. However, employees at Siemens had lived with this
warehouse very closely and had grown to rely on the comfort of the huge buffer. While dividing
their operations with a massive warehouse may be comfortable, moving operations toward leaner
manufacturing seldom is. Converting indirect kanban to direct kanban is an obvious way to
achieve factory leanness. In fact, Siemens management had generally backed this kanban
conversion philosophy. However, philosophy alone doesn't provide a methodology or
2 Hopp, W. J., M. L. Spearman. 2004. To Pull or Not to Pull: What is the Question?. Manufacturing & Service
Operations Management Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 133-148
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framework for converting these parts or implicitly provide strong impetus for the change.
Further, an absolute philosophy would ignore that the warehouse may be an appropriate solution
for some parts. A rigorous analysis was required to determine a prioritization for converting
parts and an overall idea about how important it was to pursue this project. At the conclusion of
the analysis, management greatly increased pressure on factory managers to implement their
previously stalled efforts. This struggle between the appropriateness of following pure lean
philosophy versus analytical methods is further explored in Chapter 9 below.
Having determined the need for analytic evaluation of the kanban conversion project, it was clear
that a valuation of the cost for using the warehouse was required. In order to develop this
valuation, financial data from the warehouse cost center was analyzed. All direct variable costs
were extracted and prorated for the percentage of internal parts (versus external parts) stored
there. The variable portion of transport costs to and from the warehouse was added and the total
was conservatively reduced to assume that 70% of these costs could be recoverable (as
determined in consultation with the factory operations manager). This total cost was then
divided by the number of orders entering the warehouse. This methodology was not a perfect
calculation of the true cost of each order since parts are inherently different, different box types
are harder to store/handle and batch sizes can vary dramatically. That said, this valuation
provided a good starting point and a reasonable estimate from which a list of nearly 5000 parts
could be analyzed uniformly. It was estimated that the average order of parts entering the
warehouse cost between 5 and 25 Euro/Order (See Figure 11 below - Actual number is
confidential). While this value does not seem extremely high at first glance, when considering
that nearly 5000 parts enter the warehouse 10 to 15 times throughout a year on average, the
resultant costs are very significant and could noticeably impact on the bottom line.
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Warehouse Annual Direct Costs 1 to 3 M
% of Warehouse for Internal Parts +/- 60%
Internal Orders per year 50,000 to 60,000
Warehousing Cost per Order 7 to 30
Internal Transport Ann. Direct Costs Related to WH-Line moves 20,000 to 70,000
Warehouse Transport Costs per Order 1
% of Costs that are Variable (recoverable) 70%
Total Cost Savings for Bypassing Warehouse 4owN"Mon d
(All amounts in Euros, numbers masked or given as ranges for confidentiality)
Figure 11 - Warehouse Cost Analysis
With these valuations of labor and warehouse throughput, the tradeoff among eliminating
warehouse costs, increasing setups and inventory level changes could be explored in detail.
Optimal batch sizes and the total annual incremental cost (holding, setup and warehousing) were
calculated for each of the 4500 parts manufactured in pre-production. These costs were
recalculated based on the assumption that the part would be converted to an Eigenfertigung
Kanban scheme. A key initial assumption was required to hold production frequency to an
acceptable level for the factory. In consultation with pre-production and factory management,
we decided that a batch of any particular part should not be produced more frequently than once
per week. This assumption provided a reasonable limit for decreasing batch size to start, though
would later be refined to reflect the part lead time. Comparing the total annual incremental cost
for the two kanban systems provided the estimated savings (positive or negative) if each part
were converted to the direct kanban system. (See Appendix 1 to explore the details of this
analysis)
Once arriving at a cost savings for converting parts, many other considerations had to be
explored to ensure the part was viable for direct kanban. One of the major arguments in the
factory against Eigenfertigung kanban was the amount of space required on the assembly line.
Line managers essentially refuse to carry more than 2 boxes of parts along the line, as currently
required by Umlagerung Kanban and the make-to-stock systems. Through the analysis it was
found that 78% of parts could be stored on the assembly line in only 2 boxes (another 10%
would require 3 boxes), thus proving the resistance misguided. Another major cause of angst for
the production line managers involved the reliability of pre-production to deliver orders in a
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timely manner. Deliveries coming from stock in the warehouse are usually delivered during the
following work day with high consistency, however orders from pre-production take from 2.5 to
9.5 days on average depending on the part (mean of around 5 days) and involve greater
variability (average standard deviation greater than 1 day). In order to ensure that these parts can
be reliably delivered before a stockout occurs, delivery time as well as demand variability must
be considered. Likeliness of stockout became an important criterion for prioritizing parts for
conversion. Parts with a worst case lead time (here the mean plus three standard deviations was
used) greater than the depletion time of 1 box (capacity divided by peak season daily demand)
were considered unfit for the first pass at kanban conversion.
Overall, 54% of parts fit in 2 boxes, met the lead time criterion and had positive savings! These
annual savings would total over 300,000 Euro (US$400,000). It was clear that this project was
important to the factory and approval was fast-tracked through management. The problem
remained of how to achieve lasting implementation. Though the project offered significant
savings, improper implementation could have dire consequences to a factory that is currently
reliant on large inventory buffers. The part conversions must be implemented in small groups at
the level of each product group manager and his material managers. In order to provide more
familiarity with these methodologies to these key decision makers, we provided a tool and
training . The spreadsheet tool (see Appendix 1) is an important piece of bridging the gap
between a one-time analysis and providing the factory personnel a way to make living decisions
and learn to use these methodologies on a daily basis.
8.3 Cost of Holding Inventory
Throughout the factory, with almost perfect consistency, people use 7% as the cost of capital and
holding cost. However, several costs were not being rolled into this value directly, including
scrap and variable overhead charges.
Scrap rates for inventory at the Frankfurt factory added nearly 3% to the cost of capital due to the
high incidence of part redesign. When parts are redesigned, old inventory becomes obsolete and
is scrapped. When new products are rolled out such as the new 2008 product portfolio, greatly
increased amounts of scrap are generated. This was found to be a frequent occurrence in
Frankfurt. To determine the appropriate increase to the cost of holding inventory associated with
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scrapped parts, total scrap costs and total part costs were extracted from FY2005 financial
reports. The scrap ratio is defined as follows:
ScrapRate = ScrapCost
TotalPartsCost
Where,
- ScrapCost = total cost (Euro) of all scrap parts in 2005
- TotalPartsCost = total cost (Euro) of all parts produced in 2005
This calculation yielded a scrap rate of 3.2%. However, a routine review with factory
management revealed that in April of 2005 the 8DJ product line was revised and a sizeable
number of standard parts were made obsolete. In response to this, the analysis was broken into
monthly increments to better understand the potential of April as an outlier. Removing April
data from the calculation, the scrap rate dropped only slightly to 2.8%.
The result of the analysis for scrap rate and other minor factors brought the true cost of holding
inventory to approximately 10%. Holding cost, while not as forceful a driver as lead time (see
section 8.4 below), is a significant source of impetus for completing improvement projects at the
Frankfurt plant. Though the factory was very consistent in their use of 7% as a holding cost
throughout the factory, this number was somewhat inaccurate. Accuracy and consistency are
both extremely important factors for internal valuations so that decisions made are both correct
and consistent through the organization.
8.3.1 Project Application - Safety Stock Evaluation
The results of the holding cost valuations were critical for analyzing Siemens' current levels of
safety stock. Though the results are applicable throughout the factory, this analysis concentrated
on parts manufactured in Frankfurt and held in the central warehouse. Safety stock for these
parts is managed through Siemens' SAP system. They have chosen a static method for
managing inventories and strongly believe that the dynamic methods (i.e. using moving averages
of recent historic data) in SAP are incompatible with their seasonally varying demand. Siemens
demand does reflect a slight seasonal demand, which could be handled in SAP fairly accurately.
A larger problem for the dynamic method is that customer orders tend to group similar or
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identical products in their orders. This demand clustering, is directly reflected at the individual
part level within each product group and can make moving averages highly unreliable. For
example, a Swedish customer ordering 50 panels would tend to order a particular model with
parts particular to their country or regulatory environment. This clustering along with slight
seasonality influenced Siemens to use a static inventory management system within SAP.
The static inventory levels were very consistent across large groups of parts. Inventory levels for
almost every part are set in one of two ways. For frequently utilized parts, a minimum of 10
days of parts (based on current demand) are maintained in stock. The second method involves a
specific minimum quantity. These minimum levels are not the reorder points of classic
inventory management models, but rather a minimum level that the system actively targets. The
nature of this business involves long product delivery times on the order of 4-10 weeks and short
internal part delivery times on the order of 1-5 days. This allows SAP to determine future part
requirements to a high level of precision and results in new part orders consistently arriving
when inventory levels reach the targeted quantity. By this methodology, on time part arrival
should be 50% and frequency of stockouts should be extremely low. (Please see the end of
Section 7.2 above for more detail on how SAP manages stocks)
The frequency of use in SAP of 10 days or 100 parts as minimum stock targets, indicates a
somewhat arbitrary process and is inconsistent with a well thought out analytical approach to
inventory management. Clearly there exists some value in adding a more rigorous approach to
determining these base stock levels. The Safety Stock project quantifies these savings and
recommends an improved course of action for managing factory inventories.
Initial calculations, using the formula below, suggested that average inventories in the factory
were about 50% higher than required.
SS = Z * DD LT
Where; z = safety fiactor, LT = lead time, DD = Daily Demand, a = average and a-= standard deviation
A 99.99% service level was used here as indication of a stockout event at the part level, which
would result in an estimated 7 stock out events throughout the year for all parts (see table below).
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This relatively high service level is required at the part level since there are so many parts that go
into each end-product and any one of them could cause problems at the assembly line. Most
factory assembly lines currently experience part stockouts, or near-stockouts on a weekly basis.
They routinely handle these problems by expediting part orders, which can usually be turned
around within a day or two from pre-production. A table of results for average expected
stockouts that affect assembly lines throughout the factory can be seen below along with
estimated savings as generated during final stages of this analysis. The annual expected number
of stockouts was calculated based on the average number of part types needed for a finished
product and the corresponding service level/safety factor applied at the part level. The analysis
assumes part demand is normally distributed and independent among parts, which is reasonable
though not perfect since equipment failure and capacity constraints in pre-production would
affect a great number of parts during each event. This table can be used by management to set a
proper service level target and aid the decision of trading off safety stock savings (based on 10%
holding cost) for limiting the number of stockouts.
Estimated
SS Cost Stock Out
Service Level Savings Events z Factor
99.500% 63500 339 2.58
99.900% 55700 68 3.09
99.930% 54100 47 3.19
99.960% 51700 27 3.35
99.990% 46200 6.8 3.72
99.999% 37900 1.0 4.26
Figure 12 - Stockout Consideration
As can be seen in Figure 13 below, there are decreasing returns for eliminating stockouts and a
distinctive inflection point, which should aid in this managerial decision.
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Figure 13 - Exploration of Service Level
Since there was such a strong indication of potential savings, a more detailed analysis was
initiated to factor in variation of demand, variation of part lead time to the assembly line,
particular intricacies of the parts and pre-production areas and other fixed requirement factors
such as the 'chunkiness' of part production (i.e. real and perceived restrictions on batch size).
When calculating safety stock with variable lead time and demand, the following equation was
used:
SS Z * PLT *DD2 +/IDD2 47LT 2 4
One interesting result found in exploring the Frankfurt factory, is that demand for most parts is
accurately known in SAP before part production must begin (Lead Times < Delivery Date -
Order Date). In these cases the actual net lead time is negative, though for the sake of safety
stock calculation cannot be less than zero. For example, it takes 3 days on average to produce a
particular bent steel part, but demand is known with near-certainty weeks in advance. Thus YDD
is set to zero and leaves:
SS = z* PDD2 * ULT 2 Z DD LT
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Which is just the portion of safety stock that is associated with variable lead time; the z
percentile of expected lead time multiplied by the average expected demand each day.
This is an interesting result and speaks in part to the value of MRP systems - when you can set
and fix the master assembly schedule; then component demand is known with near-certainty and
this source of variation is eliminated. In application however each product has differing amounts
of "SAP foresight", some parts have very long lead times and/or very lumpy demand. Thus the
master schedule cannot be fixed far enough in advance to cover these lead times and the MRP
system does not completely eliminate variation of daily demand. The mean net lead time would
have to be well below zero such that an unconstrained distribution would not have any
substantial volume above zero (and thus creating potential for stockouts). For this project, these
effects were ignored since management was unwilling to rely on SAP in this manner, in-part for
the reasons outlined above. The benefit from ERP software is limited to acting as an extra buffer
supporting on-time part delivery. One additional note of interest is that projects resulting in
customer lead time reductions (discussed in Section 8.4) could actually increase the amount of
safety stock if SAP foresight is considered (since previously negative lead times could suddenly
become positive).
Another major factor for analyzing proper safety stock levels is management's strategy for
dealing with seasonal demand and tight capacity restrictions in some pre-production areas.
According to factory management, resin, which is a highly uncontrolled and specialized process,
had to be removed from the analysis for this reason. The level production of resin parts in
Frankfurt builds inventory during the year for the peak summer season. Aluminum parts were
also removed because outside vendors were involved, lead times were long and management was
opposed to tweaking this critical piece of their supply chain.
The remaining parts were analyzed using the formulations shown above, providing a snapshot
analysis of savings for reevaluating safety stock levels. The analysis indicated that inventory
levels could be reduced by 45% (462,000E), which would result in annual savings of around
46,200C. This result utilized some estimates of variation based on the volume of product
demand. Demand levels were categorized into groups of high, medium, low volume and 'rare'
with standard deviations taking on various multiples of daily demand. For example, typical high
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volume parts were found to have standard deviations approximately equal to 40% of daily
demand, while low volume parts tended to be closer to 4 times daily demand.
Perhaps the most beneficial result of this work is the training of staff on the methodologies used
and enabling material managers at the base levels of the organization to look at their decisions
analytically. As touched upon earlier, experience is important in the role of the material manager
and most inventory level decisions are made based on either experienced estimates by these
personnel, or as reactions to problems experienced in the factory. The tool provided can help to
correct both of these problems. First, analytic support is provided to help make sound decisions
on a day-to-day basis while still incorporating the intrinsic knowledge and experience of these
employees. Second, reaction to problems on the factory floor has the unidirectional effect to
increase overall inventory levels. By eliminating these one-time changes and objectively
analyzing the available data, areas for improvement can be spotted and further considered.
8.4 Lead Time Valuation
Throughout the life of Project Portfolio 2008, managers have struggled with the importance of
customer lead time. While the ability to deliver product to a customer in less time intuitively has
some value, quantifying this benefit has been a significant challenge. Without understanding the
value of lead time reductions, projects with this result stand in limbo without economic
justification or clear political backing to reach fruition.
In Siemens PTD, product lead time is discussed almost exclusively as a deadline. The idea that a
particular switchgear product must be offered within one specific lead time for all customers is
not a market driven fact and provides no incentive to reach beyond this somewhat arbitrary mark.
In practice, the market research used to set this mark is relatively thin and is often
unscientifically modified to meet existing capabilities, rather than market forces. In contrast,
establishing the value of lead time for particular product groups enables managers and executives
to make intelligent decisions and evaluate individual projects on their particular merits.
Since material management systems vary across areas of the factory, analysis was separated into
three major categories. In each of these areas (pre-production activities, order processing
activities and assembly activities) a reduction of processing time produces varying outcomes.
Most activities in pre-production are feeders into inventory buffers and thus affect safety stock,
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but do not affect customer lead times under the current operating structure. Activities in order
processing affect customer satisfaction directly, but only affect customer lead time after a
contract is signed. All assembly work and queuing occurring after the contract is signed directly
affect customer lead time. It is this last area that contains the most opportunity and thus the area
on which much of the analysis is focused. Many potential opportunities reduced customer lead
time alone, while others were offset by other project costs.
8.4.1 Project Application - Laser Welding Production Planning
One example of such a project idea where inventory and lead time savings were offset by
increases in capital and setup labor costs, concerns several massive laser welding machines.
Laser welders are responsible for the very critical step of welding together the hermetically
sealed core part housings. In an example of classic mass manufacturing mentality, a few huge
laser welding machines requiring long setups are operated with the goal of maximizing run time.
To accomplish this goal, large batches are required. Orders are grouped each morning in order to
minimize setups, resulting in a long queue of orders ahead of this work area. The assembly
processes immediately following laser welding prefer to sequence their work by delivery date so
that different parts of an order arrive together at shipping and to ensure that customer dates are
met. The result of this reordering is a 24 hour queue of partially finished core parts between
laser weld and core part assembly on a gigantic 5 level pallet rack. Additionally, the non-value
added human efforts of palletizing, placing, retrieving and de-palletizing the partially finished
core parts are significant.
The project idea revolves around reducing the period over which the laser welding area is
optimized (currently daily), resulting in reduction of inventory and customer lead time.
Additionally, the wasted movements described above could be eliminated by purchasing
additional mechanized assembly wagons (required at the following work station) to hold the
parts in the buffer. This caveat produces further incentive to reduce the buffer size, as the
capital costs can be quite significant. It is also important to note that reducing setup time or
eliminating the need for setups altogether is the preferred solution. In this case, this was not
possible during the term of this project, but was emphatically highlighted during manufacturing
planning and redesign for the Project Portfolio 2008 effort.
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The analysis showed that inventory savings did not offset the increased cost of setups alone, but
when the value of lead time reductions are considered the project becomes economically
advantageous. Lead time is important here since this process is on the critical path for customer
delivery. Final results of this analysis are shown in Figure 14 below. As the size of the laser
welding optimization period (batch size) decreases, capital and inventory costs are reduced,
while setup costs rise. The existing practice as described above is to sort orders once per day,
reducing direct costs to this department, but the minimum cost global solution is to sort orders
every 6 hours. A steep rise occurs as the optimization period approaches one-piece flow due to a
rapid rise in setup costs. The gentle slope on the right side of the curves is due to lead time
reductions only partially offset by slowly increasing setup costs. In this case the project was
transferred to the welding manager along with the recommendation to optimize the station over
an 8-hour shift (rather than each day) and seek ways to reduce setup time.
LASER Welding Sequencing Optimization
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Figure 14 - Laser Welding Sequence Analysis Results
The laser welding sequence illustration shows the importance of lead time valuation to create
proper incentives and justification for improvement projects. But, where is the value of lead
time derived and how can it be estimated? By providing the customer a faster delivery, the
manufacturer should be able to increase units sold and/or the price charged for the units. Thus
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value is realized through increased revenues. Additionally, secondary costs and benefits of
inventory, labor etc. must be evaluated. Projecting the sales effect of a product change is an
incredibly hard task especially when the change has been untested. Establishing agreement
within Siemens on even a bare minimum baseline of 1-2% increase in revenue would be enough
to fundamentally change the way customer lead time is approached.5 The reasoning followed
that projects affecting lead time would be very attractive to the business and drive several stalled
projects forward. Without specific valuation, incentive to reduce customer lead time was not
present and many high value opportunities went unnoticed.
8.4.2 Lead Time in terms of Euro value
In developing the logic behind how customers will react to changes in product lead time,
agreement from the head of sales in Siemens' Erlangen, Germany office would be needed. At
Siemens, formal authority is extremely important. Success depended on the ability to negotiate
and agree on a plausible minimum sales effect with many layers of sales personnel. Starting
with the Project Portfolio 2008 resident sales department representative, it was surprising to find
his gut-feel estimate to be many times higher than the baseline estimate.
A large portion of product volume is sold in the form of large contracts where the type and date
of delivery are clearly defined for the length of the contract. Siemens top five 8DJ customers
combine for over 30% of panels manufactured, a large portion of which are planned deliveries.
Further, some customer delivery requests are made with delivery lead times much longer than
existing lead times. Neither of these groups would directly benefit from reduced lead times.
However, the capability for better lead times versus competitors can be marketed to customers
and provide some (not quantified here) psychological effect consistent with product quality and
overall firm capabilities. Aided by order data, sales personnel estimate the percentage of
customer orders where lead time plays an important role in the purchase decision at 70% or
more. Historical data suggests that a few large customers comprise a significant portion of sales,
while the smallest 83% of customers combine for only 16% of sales.
5 Determined in-part through conversations with Professor Graves during a visit to the Frankfurt plant
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Considering these factors, the 20% increase in sales seemed possible, but did not provide a bare
minimum that everyone could agree upon. Through some negotiation and consideration of sales
data, it was determined that 5% was an acceptable minimum increase that could be expected
from a 50% reduction in lead time for 8DJ and 8DH. This baseline was agreed upon by other
sales representatives and finally by the head of sales himself.
Since this was a baseline estimate, we simplified the approach to say that increased revenues
directly translate into increased profits. The assumption here is that profit margins are constant;
no economies of scale are realized and no additional value is extracted from the psychological
effects described above. While these affects could be estimated (predicted to a rather limited
degree of accuracy), the baseline is more than ample to promote reduction of lead time through
several current project ideas. The following graph shows how this sales increase was simply
translated into the value of 8DJ lead time in Euros per Day. Though this is broken down into
daily increments for convenience, we recognized that value will not be realized until Siemens
can promise a customer reduced delivery in 1 week increments. Thus, several smaller projects
may need to be combined in order to realize value for each lead time reductions.
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Figure 15 - Lead Time Valuation Breakdown
8.4.3 Project Application - Exact Parts
The project most directly related to lead time actually involves increasing inventory levels; an
action that is somewhat incongruent to what most people consider 'lean'. Most lean programs
push the absolute reduction of inventory, rather than recognizing tradeoffs between buffers, of
which inventory is only one type. In thinking through the critical path for customer lead time,
we imagined the customer's order traveling through the entire process from order processing
through delivery. This was completed for products associated with Projekt Porfolio 2008, as
shown in the to-scale timeline below for 8DJ.
8DJ Switchgear: Customer Lead Time for Foreign Sales
Figure 16 - Average Timeline for 8DJ Process
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Figure 17 -Actual Times for 8DJ from Frankfurt's M2 Tool
As can be seen above the average customer traveling through the 8DJ process would spend a few
days in order processing, which involves a few trips back and forth from the home country to the
sales department in Germany. Next, the customer waits around with no interaction for 3 weeks,
progresses through assembly for 5 days (including two 24 hour queues and 7 hours of value
added time) before finally being wrapped and packed into a truck. The customer spends a total
of 4 weeks on this virtual trip with less than 10 hours (2%) of his/her time actively engaged.
The search to find the reasoning behind this central 3-week period of waiting turned up some
surprising results. Initial conversations with material planners revealed that almost every order
contained "Exacte Teile" or Exact Parts, which are purchased specifically for a particular order
only after that order had been processed. Further, this individual believed that each order only
had one or two exact parts. In effect this would have meant that the factory was holding up
assembly of a product for which they had 499 parts in stock, while waiting for delivery of the
500th part. The reason given was not surprising. Since these parts were infrequently ordered, it
would cost "too much" to keep them in inventory. The shortsightedness of an individual
department deep in the heart of the organization was not surprising; the workers were focused on
materials management and did not often consider how their decisions affected customer lead
time or the consequent effect on product sales. Considering effects beyond the departmental
level; the cost of holding stock for 1 additional part is often much lower compared to the value of
reducing delivery times on a few orders by several weeks.
Data showed that only 30% of 8DJ orders contained exact parts. The immediate hypothesis held
that delivery of these orders must be much longer than orders not affected by exact parts.
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Surprisingly, this was quickly disproved as distribution of customer lead time for orders with
exact parts proved to be almost identical to the orders without (See Figure 18 below). Notice the
obvious local maximums occurring at multiples of 5 working days (one week) throughout the
chart. This is mostly the effect of working to deliver orders to a customer on a specific delivery
date (not earlier or later) as determined during order processing and measured in weeks. Since
the assembly start date is tied directly to the promised delivery date, it is clear that the 70% of
orders not containing exact parts wait for an average of nearly 3 weeks until any work is
completed.
Figure 18 - Process Variation and Exact Parts
If these 7000 non-exact part 8DJ orders were identifiable at the time of ordering and customers
were promised a 2-week delivery, a minimum of 350,000 Euro of additional revenue would be
captured each year (as estimated by the lead time valuation explanation above).
Implementation for this project focused on finding ways to inform sales personnel and
convincing management of the potential of these new ideas. First, sales personnel must be able
to differentiate orders with and without exact parts. Siemens is committed to flexibility and
offering very customized solutions and so simply eliminating exact parts is not an option. The
best solution for providing information to the sales force was found in their existing home-grown
54
Effect of Exact Parts on Process Variation
Customer Delivery Times from M2 Tool
160....
S140 "'0.,
120
100 With EP
-- Without EP
-M 80 6 ------- Normdist w/L_ 
-
-... Normdist w/o0
60
k20z
0
Work Days
computerized ordering tool. A small list containing the standard selections containing exact
parts could be added to the software database. A small modification to the tool would indicate to
the sales person that an exact part is present and that a longer lead time is required. This first
change is expected to have two significant effects. First, lead times could be immediately cut in
half for 70% of current orders. Second, natural selection would decrease use of exact parts as
sales personnel entering orders for customers with immediate needs would tend to avoid exact
parts orders.
Furthermore, it is possible to further increase the number of orders eligible for shortened delivery
times by strategically stocking parts that are currently classified as "exact". Using data from
SAP, including frequency and quantity of order, appropriate stocking levels were calculated for
the exact parts. Once the stocking plan was approved by the 8DJ product manager, the most
frequently ordered parts were converted into normal stock parts with a minimum inventory level
to trigger a restock order. Though increasing inventory seems counter-intuitive and perhaps
incongruous to lean thinking, it is an intelligent decision in this case, made possible by
understanding the valuations of several factors.
It is also important to note the importance of working with suppliers to shorten lead times for
delivery of these parts, which would render the stocking effort unnecessary. Unfortunately,
language barriers prevented much work in this particular area during the internships.
8.5 Lead Time Variation
Process variation is another critical factor that must be considered when converting these ideas
into actionable, customer valued projects. Most work is thought of and evaluated based on
averages, but the amount and frequency of deviation from the mean can be just as important to
understand. Throughout the process mapping exercise, employees would state deviations from
the standard process, often in the form of rework loops or exceptional items. For instance, one
interviewee stated that a particular computer entry process took 20 minutes per order, but took 4
hours for about 10% of orders. This large deviation is important to understand, as it can have a
large impact on the flow of orders through the process. Information recorded always included
both the amount of time required to complete the added step and the probability that it would be
required. In order to promise the customer a reduced lead time, it is especially important to
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ensure the product could be delivered within a reasonable degree of accuracy. One example
where this reasoning was applied to project analysis is in order processing.
Total order processing times found during the process mapping exercise were consistently lower
than the actual throughput durations observed from Frankfurt production data. This was not
surprising since the critical path was calculated based on the most likely scenario, which ignored
rework loops and other variation from the norm. We recognized that customer promises are not
made based on the average throughput time, but rather on a reasonably assured throughput time
(say the 98th percentile). To explain how this variability affects customer lead time, please refer
to figure 19 below. Average "Best Case" and "Worst Case" (including all rework) Gantt charts
were developed along with the probability density function (PDF) "Actual Distribution", which
shows the probability distribution that links two extremes In the case of 8DJ foreign sales, the
best case time for processing an order might be 2.75 days, while the worst case is 6.75 days. By
combining the probabilities and resulting delay for each potential event a PDF emerges. In this
case, if Siemens chose to promise the customer delivery times based on the 9 8 th percentile, they
would allow 4.25 days for this process. By understanding lead time through this example,
tangible incentives to reduce lead time by eliminating process variation become apparent.
Several projects that removed variation, usually by reducing the likelihood of rework loops or by
making processes more robust, were evaluated using this methodology.
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Figure 19 - Process Variation Analysis for 8DJ Foreign Sales Order Processing
This analysis involved error reduction for incoming orders by standardizing the process for
handling orders in field locations throughout the world. The method suggested for realizing
these sales was a web-based training platform. The training material and standardized processes
were already fully developed. Furthermore, Siemens' Communications division provides
extensive computer based training (CBT) throughout the corporation. Despite PTD being the
only Siemens division that declined participation in the CBT program, the Communications
department agreed to host a training module for these purposes. The project was pitched to the
head of the related sales department and transferred to that division for implementation.
8.6 Factors Without Discrete Valuation
Other considerations such as labor availability and capital utilization can be both extremely
important and extremely complex to evaluate. The German labor market is widely portrayed in
the business press as being highly inflexible. Surprisingly, labor at the Frankfurt factory was
more flexible compared to union labor in the US. Whole shifts could be reorganized to fit
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changing demand conditions, though this was usually conducted on more of a multiple-week
basis. An hour banking system ensures that workers are paid for a minimum number of hours in
return for schedule flexibility. In this system, management has a high level of control over when
an employee reports to and leaves the workplace as demand and internal factory dynamics
change.
Whereas labor was rather flexible and largely available, over utilization of capital equipment was
a larger concern. Utilization as used here includes only time for setups and for useful work,
which is then divided by the available time for the tool (here 24 hours a day for 5 days each
week). This helps determine the feasibility of performing increased factory operations provided
the current capital structure. The peak demand and available capacity of capital equipment such
as laser welding machines, sheet metal bending tools etc. must be well understood to avoid
unexpected bottlenecks. These considerations were largely handled by understanding baseline
operating capacities and calculating expected changes for any major change proposal. For
example, several project suggestions involved reducing batch size, which in turn increased the
number of setups and finally reduced tool availability. The results of this waterfall of change
were checked to ensure capital utilization did not exceed 80% (as found to be nearing the limit of
current capabilities in the factory). This dynamic valuation to capacity limit encroachment
formed an iterative process, allowing consideration of factors that are extremely difficult to
calculate otherwise.
A capacity planning tool was also generated to provide Siemens the ability to explore how
increases in sales volume would affect capital utilization. This tool also explored expectations
for capital purchases to handle increased volumes through several different methods. This model
will be especially helpful as Siemens looks ahead to the rollout of Portfolio 2008 products, which
is expected to be a period of high demand growth and market share expansion.
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9 Our Struggle - Analytics versus Lean Philosophy
Over the course of this project analysis the project team has learned a great deal about the way in
which a factory can effectively undertake large-scale improvement. The bulk of this thesis leans
toward the more heavily analytical approach to evaluating factory improvement. However, the
initial phase I of this project was strikingly similar to a lean factory improvement initiative.
First, understand the process and map it out to understand how value is delivered to the
customer. Next, identify waste in the process that inhibits value creation or creates waste within
the organization. It is at this next step that the two methods diverge. In a philosophically lean
approach, the project ideas would be immediately driven to implementation on the principle that
waste should be eliminated.
We acknowledge that this is not the first paper to search for the proper balance along the
spectrum between pure philosophy and analytic rigor. The explosion of 'Lean Manufacturing'
programs spurred by management literature attempting to unlock the secrets of the Toyota
Production System (TPS) has left incredible confusion in its wake. These programs are often
extremely different in their aims and often unrecognizable in comparison with their TPS origin.
Buffers, whether in the form of time, capacity or inventory, are necessary in the production
environment due to variability. In recognizing this fact, Hopp and Spearman sum up the
problem nicely in defining the object of lean as the elimination of the costs of buffering."
Given that the goal of a company is to make money, the aim should not be to reduce buffers, but
rather to minimize the costs resulting from buffering. In this approach, it was necessary to first
explore and understand the internal costs at play in the factory and only then determine the best
way to modify operations in the interest of profits (that is both cost and revenue). Successful
philosophies aimed at dealing with non-obvious waste can be developed only after these factors
are well understood.
In a 1991 HBS article, Zipkin speaks at length about the differences between "romantic"
philosophical approaches to just in time (JIT) versus more pragmatic and realistic methods.x He
further develops the contrast between philosophical thinkers portraying inventory as inherently
evil, while pragmatists recognize it as one form of buffer. Inventory buffers need to be balanced
along with other forms of buffers to maximize profit.
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In this project, the areas of opportunity were closely scrutinized through a series of detailed
valuation techniques to determine the Euro value of the each project. Through this method
approximately half of the original project ideas were discarded if financial returns were negative,
which is a starkly different result than a lean factory improvement initiative would produce. The
following is insights into the pros and cons of each method, concluded with a proposal on how
the two should be used in concert with one another.
Lean Philosophy
The real value associated with driving factory improvement under the umbrella of Lean
Philosophy is in its agility to respond as ideas are generated. To the extent that every employee
in the organization understands the direction, it is a trivial matter to justify the importance of
undertaking a project that eliminates waste from the system. There is likely no faster and more
efficient way to achieve an end state vision than through the total acceptance and understanding
of a well designed lean program. However, this method relies on the acceptance and
understanding of employees at all levels of the organization. If skeptical managers are unwilling
to accept the philosophy at face value, the program faces the risk of halting or increasing costs.
Take, as an example, the relationship between assembly and pre-production in the Frankfurt
factory. Lean philosophy has served assembly well in its drive to be more efficient. But as the
boundary of lean extended beyond the warehouse and into pre-production, managers pushed
back. Pre-production managers did not want to drive to smaller, more frequent batches without
knowing full well the value that this added to the company and ensuring that they could reliably
meet the new constraints. This is where the lean philosophy, as implemented at Siemens, ended.
Analytical Approach
In the example above, pre-production was willing to do the right thing for the company, they just
were not willing to do it without proof. This is where the analytical approach outlined in this
thesis becomes invaluable. Consider this approach as creating the necessary activation energy to
get the lean philosophy moving again. Of course, the inherent downside to the analytical
approach is the time and resources necessary to uncover all the hidden value associated with
each potential opportunity. Clearly, a balance must be struck between the costs of estimating
and perfecting the financial support for action and the benefits to be derived from such action.
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Not all businesses would choose to allocate resources to analyze each and every continuous
improvement idea with such rigor. A critical facet of any managers role is determining how and
when to transition from analysis to action. Indeed, during this project, pressure was exerted by
many key leaders to stop generating analysis and start generating results.
Proposal
Having explored the merits and drawbacks to each method, it seems reasonable to offer a theory
on how these two methods can co-exist. In short, the lean philosophy is important in sustaining a
responsive and effective culture of continuous improvement and accomplishing more with fewer
resources. This is a very efficient process to mobilize a workforce in eliminating obvious and
less-complicated sources of waste. The analytical method is necessary to develop well-directed
philosophy to attack non-obvious opportunities and for setting priorities to improving
profitability. The value of analytics is critical to regain momentum either at the onset of the
initiative or after a stall when the initiative is expanded to new departments within the
organization. To think that one or the other method is completely correct, will only reduce the
total potential that exists in driving operational improvement in the organization.
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10 Next Steps
Throughout the project, meetings with the factory management were held to both discuss
direction of the work and to convey ideas for improving the business. The following is a
summary of the major recommendations to Siemens as they work to continually improve their
operations in Frankfurt.
Several projects have been approved by Siemens management and transferred directly to various
Siemens personnel in Frankfurt and Erlangen. Following through with these projects will help
improve operations and allow for an easier transition of the new product lines designed through
Project Portfolio 2008. Successful implementation will require active management support. We
also urge that momentum on the three most important projects, which we began, carry forward.
The processes used to develop these ideas are also extremely valuable. Throughout the project,
continual transfer of the best ideas and thought processes was accomplished through meetings
and data sharing. However, the language barrier proved to limit the value of speech and perhaps
directed the project toward a more analytic slant. Though the one-time analysis results were
transferred and made a clear point, the usefulness would be short-lived unless Siemens could
perform the analysis after the project had ended. Toward this goal, a few master spreadsheets
were produced in German (See Appendix) to assist with the calculations that became the focus of
our work and project implementations. Material managers and product managers throughout the
plant were trained on how to use these calculation tools. It is important that employees continue
to objectively evaluate their work as well as the operations around them especially, as we found,
at departmental boundaries.
Finally, it is important for Siemens to develop and promulgate well-defined valuations of internal
costs and external opportunities for common items such as handling, holding, lead time, setup
time etc. Without these, management at all levels cannot be called upon to make objective
evaluations of changes and may lack incentive to do so. Frankfurt is a well run plant inside of a
well respected international corporation and should be proud of their work. Today's work,
however, is the source of future reward and we must look forward to succeed.
62
11 Summary
As the switchgear industry continues its evolution from air insulated to gas insulated technology,
Siemens Frankfurt factory faces the task of introducing a new line of products that not only meet
customer needs in terms of function, but is also cheaper and faster to produce than the existing
product line. This paper has explored the challenges associated with making the necessary
production improvements to support the new product objectives. It is the authors' contention
that the Frankfurt factory's existing lean manufacturing initiative is not sufficient to effectively
identify all of the potential areas of improvement and implement those that provide the highest
value to the factory. Rather, the analytical project framework provided in this paper, in concert
with the existing lean efforts, is necessary to adequately steer the Portfolio 2008 effort towards
achieving its aggressive cost and lead time goals.
The framework employed over this 9 month internship process involved three primary phases.
In Phase I the current processes were researched and mapped using many of the lean value
stream mapping techniques. In Phase II, the baseline of process knowledge and performance
data was used to identify areas of opportunity and vet them through a rigorous valuation analysis.
At the conclusion of Phase II, each area of opportunity has tangible projects identified with
detailed cost/benefit analysis all in terms of Euro. Phase III simply identified the 3 most
attractive projects in terms of ROI and ease of implementation, carried these projects through
implementation, and transferred the remaining project analysis to Siemens project champions.
In reviewing the Phase I process maps, a few general observations were made that helped to
characterize the possible improvements to be made:
1. Departments were quite good at optimizing their own process. However, less
emphasis was seen on departments working together to reach a global optimum with
regards to material and information flow.
2. A high level of re-work was found throughout the process both in the physical
production process as well as the order processing and order engineering processes.
As these errors occurred later in the process, they were increasingly costly to resolve.
By engineering out the errors where they occur, one department may feel an increase
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in the total work load, but the overall process will see a reduction in cost and
customer lead time.
3. Improving customer lead time can only be achieved by reducing process time along a
product's critical path. In the case of the 8DH and 8DJ products, critical paths are
quite different. To ensure the most return on lead time reduction project resources,
the factory must take the time to understand the current drivers of lead time within the
factory.
Once areas of opportunity had been identified, the next step was to provide a rigorous analytical
approach to project valuation. To do this, it was important to rethink existing ways of valuing
inventory holding costs, material handling costs, and lead time. Lead time reduction, as an
example, was primarily thought of as an opportunity to reduce cost of production by lowering
parts and work in process inventory levels. But by offering a shorter lead time in this specific
product market, Siemens would see an increase in product sales that would also increase total
revenue. By considering both cost and revenue impacts, lead time reduction projects become far
more favorable to the business. Similarly, valuation of the cost of holding and handling
inventory was found to be systematically low. While the total cost of production was accounted
for, the detailed costs associated with material handling and costs of scrapping obsolete parts
were lost in the factory overhead values. By extracting these values and factoring them into part
level inventory optimization models, improvement projects that were considered to be low value
were found to yield substantial cost savings.
Additionally, the authors of this paper tried to build on the foundation of literature associated
with application of a lean philosophy versus application of rigorous mathematical analysis. The
resulting conclusion is that, to be effective, a factory must adopt both a strong continuous
improvement culture (such as lean) as well as apply an analytical framework of project for
project valuation. Such a framework will not only help align factory leadership when
philosophical efforts stall, but also ensure that resources are used most effectively to generate the
highest ROI possible.
As the Frankfurt factory moves forward with implementation of the projects identified during
this 9 month internship, it is the authors' hope that the analysis framework discussed in this
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paper be used on a continuing basis. By establishing a consistent set of standard values for cost
of inventory holding, material handling, and lead time, the Frankfurt factory and Portfolio 2008
team can drive ongoing analysis as business conditions change. As well, these methods would
be beneficial at a strategic level in understanding the cause and effect relationship between
pricing decisions for custom products and the total costs incurred to produce them.
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12 Appendices
12.1 Appendix - Screen Shot of Kanban Calculation Tool and Safety Stock Analysis
Nitzliche Fakten und Werkzeuge.
USEFUL DATA & TOOLS
Overall Data Assumptions (Annahmen)
Servicegrad 9,%
Arbeitstage pro Jahr
Lagerkosten (Euro/Auftrag)
Arbeitskosten (Euro pro Stunde)
Koeffizient Abweichung/Lieferzeit 4%
Kapitalkosten 1%
Standardabweichung fur selten
gebrauchte Teile (Exakte Teile)
Bestellhdufigkeit (Monate) L 6
Order Frequency (months)
jahrlicher Bedart 0
Annua Demand
Standardabweichung tAglicher Bedarf
Standard Deviation of Daily Demand
Variation fur intern
gefertigte Teile
Variation for Internally
Made Parts:
Pulvern
Spruehlackieren
Kunststoff
Pruefung
Aluminium
Abkanten/Biegen
Stanzen
Schweissen
Kupfer
Laserschneiden
Chromatieren
NC-Programmieren
Lieferzeit Taglicher Koeffizient
(Werktage) Unterschied von Variation
AVG # Work
Daily Variance
(from Monthly
Days data) Coeff Var.
0.88 0.07 21%
0.76 0.29 51%
2.40 3.21 53%
0.27 0.01 26%
0.96 0.12 26%
1.25 0.08 17%
1.91 1.30 43%
1.49 0.20 21%
2.00 4.90 79%
1.04 0.12 23%
2.68 1.00 21%
0.87 2.21 122%
Durhsefinittliche LieterZei
Durchschnittliche Lieferzeit mit zwei zusfitzlichen Transportlager
Standardabweichung Lieferzei
3aint
spray Pnt
Nlastic
rest
3end
tamp
Veld
'opper
'ut
)lating
kvg. Lead Time
kvg. Lead Time + 2 days transport
tandard Deviation of Lead Time
Count # Removed
Nummer # Entfernt
Annual Savinas
Einspan
Alle Teile 44831
Ja 2410
Zu viele Kanban 888 399
Zu wenige Auftrsge 0 0
Zu viele Auftrsge 144 24
Keine Einsparungen 1536 1536_
Fehlende Menge 114 (No Box Qty Listed)
jngen
310,34
75,08!
Limits
Grenzen
3 E '<' oder '>
9 El
All Parts
OK Ask Yourself:
Too many Kanbans >=3 Can we fit more in a box?
Too few Orders <=0 Should we put fewer in the box?
Too Many Orders >=1 00 Can we fit more in a box? Use larger box?
Vo Savings <=0 How much will this cost?
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Statistiken

12.2 Appendix - Safety Stock & Kanban Calculation Tool Training Document
Safety Stock Analysis
Introduction
Demand and leadtime are inherently variable. We hold safety stock in order to protect from production
problems. The cost of holding inventory costs approximately 10% of the inventory value. It is thus important to
minimize this inventory, while ensuring with a high level of certainty that we will not have production disruptions.
Today, most safety stock choices are made by gut feel and experience of the Disponent. The
Sicherheitbestandund_E_Kanban.xls tool provides an analytical method for calculating proper safety stock levels.
The Disponent will use the results of the analysis along with their own knowledge of the material to make a final
decision.
Safety Stock Calculation
Simple Method: SHB = z * aTB *
Where:
SHB = Sicherheitbestand (Stuck)
z = normal distribution factor (,,standnortninv" function in excel)
1 Service Level z Factor
95% 1.64
99.9% 3.09
99.999% 4.26
99.99999% 5.20
GTB = Standardabweichung thglicher Bedarf (,,Stabw" Funktion in Excel)
N
(X=F x2 - N( )2)
N -I
LZ = Durchschnittliche Lieferzeit (werktagen)
Complete Method (as used in the Excel tool):
SHB = z * jMittelwertLZ * TB2 + MittelwertTB2 *aj 2TB _Z
Where:
MittelwertLZ = Durchschnittliche Lieferzeit
MittelwertTB = Durchschnittlicher taglicher Bedarf
cLz = Standardabweichung Lieferzeit
Q^I
A-era---- Cycle Stock
Ave~rageA -- --
Factory
Inventory Safety Stock
Time
Safety Stock =Average Inventory - Order Size /2
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-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 z--
Spreadsheet explanation
Entering Data:
Columns requiring user input are in green. The row labeled "Lookup" contains formulas that can be pasted
into a row for any material number to find the appropriate data from the "Alt Daten" tab (containing
eigenfertigung part data gathered in August 2006 with demand information pertaining to May, June & July 2006).
Alternatively, the data can be determined and entered by the user (the tools on the right side may be helpful). The
columns in blue (standard deviation) can either be calculated by the user (alone or with the tools on the right) or
estimated using the formula found in the "Lookup" Row. Comments in the title cell (Row 2) explain the estimation
method.
Tools on the right side:
The first table contains data assumptions that are used throughout the spreadsheet (default values are
99.9%, 250 workdays per year, 11 Euros per order, 28 Euros per hour, 40% Lieferzeit variation and 10% Holding
Cost). The lower left area contains a method to calculate the Standardabweichung taglicher Bedarf fUr selten
gebrauchte Teile (Exakte Teile). Please read the comments for further explanation.
The rightmost tool provides a way to calculate the lieferzeit und Standardabweichung Lieferzeit fur
eigenfertigung teile if the user knows which preproduction areas are involved in making the part. Enter a "1" in
each area that is required.
Calculation:
Method 1 uses the analytical framework presented above. Method 2 uses a worst case analysis, which
requires the user to look at SAP data (up to 1 year) to find the highest demand OR to estimate this amount (for most
internal parts the average 10 day period (annual demand/25) works well). For internal parts, it is easiest to lookup
the highest 5 day period (work week) and use the calculation provided. For external and rarely used parts, it is best
to enter the highest demand over a period equal to the lead time directly into the "Sicherheitsbestand (StUck)"
column (and delete the data in the "INPUT: H6chste ftnf Tage-Periode" column).
Finally the Disponent (or other user) will use their knowledge of the material along with the calculation to
make a final decision on the proper level of safety stock. Comments can be entered to document your reasoning.
Eigenfertigung Kanban Analysis
Introduction
An important improvement philosophy at the Frankfurt plant is to implement Eigenfertigung Kanban (E-
Kanban). Major savings can be achieved by eliminating the extra movement of materials through the warehouse,
but related costs must also be understood. Increased setup times can result from decreased batch sizes and space on
the production line is limited. The SicherheitbestandundEKanban.xls tool provides an analytical method for
calculating the savings, number of kanbans required and evaluating the decision for E-Kanban conversion.
Spreadsheet Explanation
Using the input data (explained above), the spreadsheet also uses 2 different methods to calculate the
kanban size. Method 1 uses the idea that while one box is being filled, the remaining boxes must hold the safety
stock and the lead time demand. Per the philosophy at the Frankfurt plant, it is always assumed that the size of a
kanban will be equal to the box capacity. Method 2 uses the idea that while one box is being filled, the remaining
boxes must hold the highest possible demand during the lead time.
The Eigenfurtigung columns calculate annual cost changes for each part converted to E-Kanban.
"Zusstzliche Lohnkosten" is the cost of setup time. ,,LAGER EINSPARUNGEN" comes from eliminating the
handling of orders at the warehouse. KAPITALKOSTEN EINSPARUNGEN" comes from the change in the
average inventory level.
The column labeled "Alles OK?" explores several areas of potential conflict that might prevent the part
from being converted to E-Kanban. These potential conflicts are listed in the Statistiken box. Here, the limits can
be modified (example: Zu wenige Auftr5ge is the minimum number of annual orders needed. If the number of
orders is less than this amount, the "Alles OK?" column will note a conflict). If there are multiple conflicts, only
one is listed. The Statistiken box provides further information about the savings that could be achieved and the
number of parts in each category.
69
12.3 Appendix - Inventory Optimization Methodology & Batch Size Derivation
Inventory Optimization Methodology
a. Costs Considered
i. Setup Labor Cost (28 Euro/hr, Setup times from Arb.plan)
ii. Holding Cost (7% cost of capital + 3% for obsolescence)
1. Cycle Stock (reduced by smaller batches)
2. Safety Stock (reduced by lower lead time)
iii. Warehousing & Handling Cost (11 to 12 Euro per incoming order)
b. Optimization
i. Calculate Optimize Batch Size (B*) - see derivation below
ii. Bypass Warehouse and solve for TC2
1. Check validity per constraints
a. Number of kanbans (space on line)
b. Number of orders per year (turnover)
2. Revisit invalid TC2 solutions & evaluate modifications
a. Can more/less be placed in a box?
b. Would a different box type be more appropriate?
iii. Minimum of TC and valid TC2 is Optimal Solution; TC3
c. Prioritize evaluated part list by Total Savings (TC3 - original cost)
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Derivation of Optimal Batch Size
Abbreviations:
TC = Total Cost
SL = Setup Labor Cost
CSH = Cycle Stock Holding Cost
SSH = Safety Stock Holding Cost
WH = Warehouse Storage and Handling Cost (recoverable portion only)
B = Batch Size
B* = Optimal Batch Size
Total Cost Formulation:
TC = SL + CSH + SSH + WH
SL = hours/order * cost/hour * orders/year & orders/year = (qty/year)/Batch Size
SL = C1/B
CSH = Average Inventory * % holding cost = B/2 * price * % holding cost
CSH = C2 *B
SSH = safety stock level * % holding cost
SSH = C3
WH = recoverable cost/order * orders/year & orders/year = (qty/year)/Batch Size
WH = C4/B
TC = C/B+ C2 *B + C3 + C4/B
Optimal Batch Size Determination:
*Set Derivative of Total Cost equal to zero to determine Optimal Batch Size
TC aTC -Ci 
-C 4 0TC'= = -1+C2 + =
aB B 2  2 B 2
B*= C+C 4
C2
*Note that safety stock holding cost does not affect the optimal batch size
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12.4 Appendix - Future Vision for Factory Operations
CURRENT WORK FLOW
8DH
5 Days
0.5
0.5
1.5
0.5
0.5
2.0
0.3
6.3
12.2 ALL 104
11% 116 89%
8.7 Final Assembly 56
13% 65 87% 1
POSSIBLE WORK FLOW
8DH
0.5
0.5
1.5
0.5
0.5
2.0
0.3
6.3
12.2 ALL 5.5
69% 18 31%
8.7 Final Assembly 3.0
74% 12 26%
This graphic was intended as a representative example of the Frankfurt assembly process. It highlights the 8DH
assembly process from the time the customer order is released to the core part manufacturing department until final
testing. The current flow was taken from the phase I process mapping exercise. The possible work flow represents
a cummulative view if all of the identified areas of opportunity valued in phase II were successfully implemented.
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12.5 Appendix - Project Selection Graphs
U)
Expected Implementation Difficulty
LFM Implementation Siemens Implementation
SE6i j i
Areas of Opportunity
Opportunity Analysis
Identify Projects
Cost/Benefit Analysis
Implementation
Pre-Production
Assernbtly
Order Processing
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